Security Audit
AI Butler has undergone an extensive security audit — 59 audit passes across the codebase during v0.1 development, with 74 findings identified. 70 were fixed; the remaining 4 are documented as acceptable and explained below.
This page summarises the audit programme. The detailed pass-by-pass record is maintained internally and reviewed before each release.
What Was Audited
Section titled “What Was Audited”Every pass scanned the full codebase against specific attack classes. Multiple passes ran in parallel against different functional areas, then fixes happened between passes.
| Category | Focus |
|---|---|
| Injection | SQL injection, command injection, path traversal, template injection |
| SSRF / CSRF | Outbound request filtering, cross-origin protection |
| Auth | Session management, token lifecycle, webhook signature verification |
| Privilege escalation | RBAC enforcement, capability bypass, role-based routing |
| Prompt injection | LLM input sanitization, tool-result isolation |
| Concurrency | Race conditions, goroutine lifecycle, channel leaks |
| Resource exhaustion | Zip bombs, ReDoS, memory leaks, recursive expansion |
| HTTP | Request smuggling, header injection, timing attacks, CORS |
| Plugins | WASM sandbox escape, capability bypass, manifest tampering |
| Supply chain | Dependency CVEs, Go module verification, build integrity |
Audit Methodology
Section titled “Audit Methodology”Each pass followed the same structure:
- Parallel agents scan the codebase against a specific attack class
- Classification — each file is tagged FULL (real logic), STRUCTURAL (thin types), STUB (placeholder), or MISSING
- Cross-reference — compare code reality against documented behaviour
- Fix plan — prioritize findings by severity and exploitability
- Fix pass — apply fixes, add regression tests
- Re-audit — next pass verifies the fix landed and no new issues introduced
The audit was not an external third-party penetration test — that’s planned separately for the 1.0 release. This was internal, exhaustive, and transparent.
Headline Numbers
Section titled “Headline Numbers”| Metric | Value |
|---|---|
| Audit passes | 59 |
| Total findings | 74 |
| Fixed | 70 |
| Acceptable (documented) | 4 |
| Tests at audit completion | 1,586 (current: 1,681) |
| Zero CVEs introduced | ✓ |
The 4 Acceptable Findings
Section titled “The 4 Acceptable Findings”1. Voice TUI stub (low severity)
Section titled “1. Voice TUI stub (low severity)”internal/voice/tui.go detects whether arecord or sox is installed, but Start() returns an error. The stub is safe — it doesn’t pretend to work, and the error message tells the user exactly what’s missing. Voice input works on every messaging channel (Telegram, Discord, Slack, WhatsApp) via their native voice messages.
2. Wake word detector stub (low severity)
Section titled “2. Wake word detector stub (low severity)”internal/voice/wakeword.go returns an error from Start() because no open-source, Go-native, CGO-free wake word engine exists. The interface is ready for a companion app that runs Porcupine locally and signals over HTTP. Marked [~] in the tracker.
3. Connection pool is Transport config (informational)
Section titled “3. Connection pool is Transport config (informational)”internal/model/pool.go configures http.Transport settings (idle connections, timeouts, keep-alive) but isn’t a full pool with acquire/release semantics. The tracker language was tightened to reflect this rather than rewriting to add a layer of complexity that wasn’t needed.
4. Acceptable stubs list
Section titled “4. Acceptable stubs list”The 5 BYOK resource access services (sports/transit/flight/tracking/recipe) were reclassified from “complete” to “framework ready, awaiting API key” after an early pass flagged them as stubs. They return clear “configure API key” errors instead of fake data — the safer behavior.
Final Verdict
Section titled “Final Verdict”The last verification pass confirmed:
Code quality: CLEAN. Zero compile-time-only refs, zero enforcement gaps, zero vet warnings, zero test failures. 1,681 tests passing across 116 packages. The codebase is ready for open-source publication.
What’s Next
Section titled “What’s Next”- External pen test — planned for 1.0 release, results to be published
- Formal threat model — being drafted for the security architecture document
- Fuzz tests — continuous fuzzing on input parsers (YAML, JSON, webhook payloads)
- Dependency scanning — automated via GitHub Dependabot + Snyk
Responsible Disclosure
Section titled “Responsible Disclosure”Found a security issue? Please don’t file it as a public GitHub issue. Instead:
- Email security@lumabyte.co (PGP key in
SECURITY.md) - Include steps to reproduce and affected versions
- Allow 90 days before public disclosure
See SECURITY.md in the repository for the full disclosure policy.